



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S *W*

9/13/76
CHS

September 11, 1976

Copies to: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/S-S
EA
IO
S/S-I *CH*

EXDIS

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Mr. Habib *W*

FROM: EA - Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.
IO - Samuel W. Lewis

EXDIS REVIEW	
Cat. A - Caption removed:	
Cat. B - Transferred to O/TADRC	
with additional access	
controlled by S/S	
Cat. C - Caption and custody	
retained by S/S	
Reviewed by: <i>[Signature]</i>	
Date: <i>13/9/76</i>	<i>1976</i>

U.S. Position on SRV Membership in
Specialized Agencies

The Problem

In several UN Specialized Agencies and the IAEA, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) has indicated that following reunification it plans to succeed to the former South Vietnamese seat held initially by the GVN and later acceded to by the PRG. We must decide what position and actions we take as the principal bodies of various Specialized Agencies consider this issue over the next few weeks.

Background/Analysis

Unlike the case of SRV application for UNGA membership, there is no realistic prospect of keeping Hanoi out of these agencies. Nor can we expect any significant support for any attempt on our part to delay or obstruct SRV entry. We did not object last year to PRG accession to the GVN seat in several agencies.

In regard to a regional FAO meeting in August, you indicated that we should not make an issue of SRV seating. We stated at that meeting that the membership question should be decided through proper procedures at the full General Conference rather than a regional sub-body. We have also indicated this position elsewhere. The first such General Conference comes up at the International Atomic Energy Agency on September 21.

9/13/76
CHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

In a meeting on August 17 you decided that we should abstain in any votes on membership in the International Financial Institutions (IFI's), although we understand you have since agreed with Treasury to vote "no" at the IMF Board of Governors meeting September 15. We expect to be out-voted in any case.

In keeping with your decision on the FAO regional conference, referred to above, we continue to believe there is nothing to be gained from making an issue of SRV membership or provoking unnecessary debate on it in the various Agencies, where we have no veto. We are making our objections clear where it counts, i.e., in the Security Council, and we see no point in making vain tries elsewhere to exclude or obstruct SRV entry. However, we also believe we should not imply approval of Viet-Nam's membership, but rather, in the General Conferences or other principal bodies of the Specialized Agencies, we should use whatever vote or other opportunity which arises to record our reservations on the issue -- including our concern (in cases where this is relevant) that proper procedures be followed and our doubts whether the record of the SRV demonstrates its willingness to carry out obligations it undertakes.

Membership will, of course, confer both obligations and benefits on the SRV. IAEA membership will, for example, subject the SRV to controls and safeguards on the small medical research reactor which they acquired in South Vietnam (and from which we removed the fuel before the fall of Saigon). On the other hand, membership in any UN Specialized Agency will qualify the SRV for UNDP assistance, which might include projects totaling as much as \$49 million (which had been committed to the GVN in the past) over the next few years. Our general approach so far in regard to aid to the PRG (which succeeded to the GVN seat last year) has been not to object but to try to assure that any such aid should be only undertaken properly under normal Agency procedures and in reasonable amounts. We of course continue to state that we would not participate in any special or voluntary programs for Indochina.

The Options

Option 1: Abstain on any vote (or reserve on any

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

consensus decision) on the issue, but without making any dissenting statement.

PRO

-- Would be most straightforward position and would avoid necessity for unconvincing argumentation in situation where we will almost certainly be the lone dissenter.

CON

-- To the extent we wish to indicate our disapproval of SRV membership and disassociate ourselves clearly from the agency decision, this would be the least forceful way of doing so.

Option 2: Abstain on any vote (or reserve on any consensus decision) on the issue. State in low key that we believe matter deserves further consideration and clearer indication of SRV willingness to abide by obligations of membership.

PRO

-- This would clearly record and demonstrate our reservations about SRV membership without being too contentious about it. It would be a relatively forthcoming position in comparison with our probable Security Council veto, showing we are not engaged in a vendetta to block SRV participation in the international community everywhere.

CON

-- It might appear inconsistent with our Security Council stand. It might portray a somewhat more forthcoming attitude toward the SRV than we wish to show at this time.

Option 3: Vote "no" (or express strong reservation) on the issue where voting is the customary procedure. Explain our position in stronger terms than above.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~-4-~~

PRO

-- This would be more consistent with our planned Security Council position and your decision to vote no in the IMP. It would extend our attitude of disapproval of SRV membership to other agencies, even though we cannot actually prevent its entry.

CON

-- It would isolate us almost completely and underline further our inability to affect the outcome. It would be widely criticized as a "dog-in-the-manger" attitude toward the SRV.

Option 4: Force a vote and vote "no" even when voting would be contrary to normal procedure, as is the case in many specialized agencies.

PRO

-- This would indicate in the strongest terms our disapproval of SRV entry.

CON

-- It would be a highly confrontational stand and subject us to severe criticism even from our friends.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend Option 2, Abstain on any vote (or reserve on any consensus decision) on the issue in UN Specialized Agencies and other international bodies. State in low key that we believe matter deserves further consideration and clearer indication of SRV willingness to abide by obligations of membership.

For the IMP/IBRD: Approve _____ Disapprove _____

For the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Approve _____ Disapprove _____

For the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

For all the other UN
Specialized Agencies Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Alternatively, you may prefer Option 3, Vote "no" or express strong reservation on the issue. Explain our position in stronger terms than above.

For the IMF/IBRD SEP 13 1976 Approve HL Disapprove _____

For the ADB SEP 13 1976 Approve HL Disapprove _____

For the IAEA SEP 13 1976 Approve HL Disapprove _____

For all other UN
Specialized Agencies Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Alternatively, you may wish to choose Option 1, Abstain on any vote (or reserve on any consensus decision) on the issue, but without making any dissenting statement. I prefer this option.

For the IMF/IBRD Approve _____ Disapprove _____

For the ADB Approve _____ Disapprove _____

For the IAEA Approve _____ Disapprove _____

For all other UN
Specialized Agencies Approve _____ Disapprove _____

We do not recommend Option 4, Force a vote and vote "no", even when voting would be contrary to normal procedure.

Drafted:
EA/VLC:JDRosenthal:chg
9/11/76; Ext 231132

Clearance:
L/EA - Ms. Verville

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~